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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1988

WILLIAM DYKENS,

Petitioner,

v.

EASTERN AIRLINES, INC.

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit's holding that the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1)) pre-empts California's civil rights law (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54.1(a) and 54.3), enacted to enable disabled individuals to participate in the social and economic life of the state, conflicts with this Court's holdings that there is a presumption against finding pre-emption of state law in areas traditionally regulated by the states.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit's holding that the anti-pre-emption provision of the Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. § 1506) does not save Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54.1(a) and 54.3, conflicts with *Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.*, 426 U.S. 290 (1976) and *Bieneman v. City of Chicago*, 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988), *cert. denied* 88-1496 (1989).

LIST OF PARTIES

Petitioner is unable to list all parent companies, subsidies or affiliates of respondent Eastern Airlines, Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED i

LIST OF PARTIES ii

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 1

OPINIONS BELOW 1

JURISDICTION 2

RELEVANT STATUTES 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 9

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT PRE-EMPTS CALIFORNIA'S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTE, AS IT AFFECTS AIR COMMON CARRIERS, CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S RECENT PRE-EMPTION CASES AND IMPERMISSIBLY INVADES A FIELD TRADITIONALLY OCCUPIED BY THE STATES 9

CONCLUSION 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Air Transport Ass'n v. Public Utilities Com'n, 833 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1987) 6

Anderson v. USAIR, Inc., 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 8, 9

Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988), *cert. den.* 88-1496 (1989) 12, 13, 14

California Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) 6

California v. ARC America Corporation, No. 87-1862, 57 L.W. 4425 (1989) 9

Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987) 10

Greater Westchester v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86 (1979), *cert. den.* 449 U.S. 820 (1980) 12, 13

Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985) 6, 10, 15

Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984) ..... *passim*

Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines, 682 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 9, 16

In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205 (1970) 10

In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 728 (1979) 11

James v. Marineship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721 (1944) 11

Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) 6, 15

Louisiana Public Serv. Com'n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355 (1986) 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975) 13, 14

Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) 6

Massachusetts v. Morash, No. 88-32, 57 L.W. 4429 (1989) 10

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976) 4, 6, 7, 12

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) 14

People v. Western Airlines, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d 297 (1984) 12

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) 10

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1983) 6, 14

OTHER AUTHORITIES

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) 2

49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) 3, 4, 5, 9, 12, 16

49 U.S.C. § 1506 ..... 3, 7, 12

Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West 1989) 10, 11

Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(a) ..... *passim*

Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3 ..... *passim*

No. _____

In The

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October Term, 1988

WILLIAM DYKENS,

Petitioner,

v.

EASTERN AIRLINES, INC.

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner William Dykens respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and memorandum of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered in the above-entitled proceeding on January 5, 1989.

OPINIONS BELOW

The memorandum of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is unreported and is set forth as Appendix A, App. 1-3.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the United States District Court for the Central District of California (Byrne, D.J) is unreported and is set forth as Appendix B, App. 4-9.

JURISDICTION

On March 25, 1986 petitioner filed his compliant for damages in the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of Los Angeles alleging, *inter alia*, that respondent Eastern Airlines, Inc., violated federal and state law when it wrongfully refused to fly him because of his physical disability. Respondent properly removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

The Ninth Circuit filed its unreported memorandum on January 5, 1989. App. A. Petitioner's duly filed petition for rehearing, with a suggestion for rehearing en banc, was denied on March 6, 1989. A copy of the order denying the petition is set forth as Appendix C, App. 10.

The jurisdiction of this Court to review the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

RELEVANT STATUTES

A. *State Laws:*

Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(a) (West 1982) provides in relevant part:

> [P]hysically disabled persons shall be entitled to the full and equal access as other members of the general

> public, to accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of all common carriers, airplanes, . . .

Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3 (West 1982) provides in relevant part:

> Any person or persons, firm or corporation who denies or interferes with the admittance to, or enjoyment of the public facilities as specified in section [ ] . . . 54.1, or otherwise interferes with the rights of . . . physically disabled persons under section [ ] . . . 54.1 . . . is liable for each such offense for the actual damages and any amount as may be determined . . . up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damages . . . and such attorneys fees as may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied any of the rights provided in section [ ] . . . 54.1.

B. *Federal Statutes:*

Title 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988) provides in relevant part:

> [N]o state . . . shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority . . . to provide air transportation.

49 U.S.C. § 1506 (West 1976) provides:

> Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. On March 25, 1986, petitioner, a mobility handicapped individual, filed a complaint in the Superior

Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles alleging that Eastern Airlines, Inc. (Eastern) had subjected him to handicap discrimination in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(a) when the airline refused to permit him to fly without an attendant. In accordance with Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3, petitioner sought attorneys fees in addition to compensatory and treble damages.[1] Eastern removed the case to the District Court for the Central District of California.

Following a court trial, the District Court found that petitioner was a "qualified handicapped person" who was eligible to board Eastern's aircraft as a non-ambulatory person able to take care of his own needs, and that Eastern had wrongfully refused to transport petitioner because of his disability. Notwithstanding its ruling that Eastern had wrongfully refused to transport him, the District Court ruled that petitioner's "claims under California Civ. Code §§ 54.1 and 54.3 are pre-empted by 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)." App. 9. The District Court also ruled however, that Eastern was "liable to plaintiff for a breach of its common law duty under *Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.*, 426 U.S. 290 (1976)."[2] App. 9. The District Court awarded petitioner $15,000 in compensatory damages, stating that petitioner experienced the inconvenience of making another trip to the airport which was difficult for

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[1] Petitioner also sought damages for infliction of emotional distress and for violation of federal law. The District Court denied relief on these causes of action, App. 8-9, and petitioner does not challenge those rulings.

[2] The Ninth Circuit assumed that "the ruling was based upon state common law" and disregarded "the pre-emption problems inherent in such a ruling." App. 3.

a handicapped person; that he missed one day of vacation; that he was without his belongings for one day since his baggage was on the plane from which he was excluded; and that he suffered justifiable emotionally severe agitation of a temporary nature. App. 7.

The District Court denied petitioner's claims for attorneys fees and treble damages, and petitioner appealed from said ruling. Eastern did not file a cross-appeal.

B. On January 5, 1989, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, in an unpublished memorandum, stating that the District Court had properly determined that under *Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines*, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54.1(a) and 54.3 were pre-empted. App. 2. The Ninth Circuit quoted *Hingson* as follows:

> [Federal] pre-emption [by the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)] is not limited to those state laws or regulations that *conflict* with federal law. It pre-empts state laws and regulations "*relating* to rates, routes, or services." Regulation of air carrier seating policies for handicapped passengers involves the regulation of services within the meaning of [the Federal Aviation Act].

App. 2.

After quoting *Hingson* the Ninth Circuit stated that "[j]ust as the passenger's claim for unlawful discrimination on the basis of handicap was held pre-empted in *Hingson*, so must this similar claim be held pre-empted here." App. 2. The Ninth Circuit made no attempt to defend *Hingson*, nor did it address petitioner's

submission that *Hingson* should be overruled because it is in conflict with this Court's recent pre-emption cases.[3]

While the Ninth Circuit did not discuss this Court's pre-emption cases, it did address petitioner's argument that it should re-examine *Hingson* in light of *Air Transport Ass'n v. Public Utilities Com'n*, 833 F.2d 200, 207 (9th Cir. 1987), where the Court stated that "there was nothing in the history of the Airline Deregulation Act to indicate congressional intent to pre-empt state regulation of utilities insofar as such regulation affected airlines," and therefore "the Federal Aviation Act did not pre-empt California utility regulations that prohibited the surreptitious monitoring of employees' telephone conversations." App. 2. The Court ignored the fact that there is similarly nothing in the Aviation Act suggesting that Congress intended to pre-empt California's anti-discrimination law.

The Ninth Circuit also noted in passing that there was "a pre-emption problem inherent" in the District Court's ruling that Eastern was liable for damages for violating California's common law, in light of its ruling

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[3] In his opening brief, petitioner relied on the following cases: *California Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra*, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); *Hillsborough County Fla. v. Auto Med. Labs*, 471 U.S. 707 (1985); *Jones v. Rath Packing Co.*, 430 U.S. 519 (1977); *Louisiana Public Serv. Com'n v. F.C.C.*, 476 U.S. 355 (1986); *Maryland v. Louisiana*, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); *Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.*, 426 U.S. 290 (1976); *Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.*, 464 U.S. 238 (1983). The Ninth Circuit did not mention any of these cases.

that California's parallel statutory provision was pre-empted.[4] App. 3

C. In his petition for rehearing, petitioner urged the Court of Appeals to impanel an en banc to overrule *Hingson* because it conflicts with this Court's pre-emption cases. Petitioner called the Ninth Circuit's attention to the fact that the District Court relied on the antipre-emption provision of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1506, when, citing *Nader,* it held Eastern liable for breach of California's common law duty of carriage, and argued that *Nader* made clear that the antipre-emption provision bars pre-emption unless it be found that pre-existing common law or statute is so repugnant to the Aviation Act that the survival of the state right would in effect deprive the federal act of its efficacy; "in other words, render its provisions nugatory." *Nader, supra,* 426 U.S. at 298.

Relying on *Nader* petitioner argued that the impact that might result from the imposition of tort liability on Eastern pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54.1(a) and 54.3 would be merely incidental and that, accordingly "both federal and state law may co-exist as contemplated by 49 U.S.C. § 1506." *Nader, supra,* at 300. Moreover, petitioner noted that *Nader* recognized that "a wrong may be of the sort that calls for compensation to an injured individual," and argued that this was such a case.

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[4] *Hingson* itself contains the same inherent inconsistency. After ruling that Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(a) was pre-empted, the Ninth Circuit added that Mr. Hingson's "claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . are not pre-empted." 743 F.2d at 1416.

Petitioner asserted that Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54.1(a) and 54.3 were civil rights laws which depended heavily upon private enforcement, and that the remedies provided by § 54.3 – attorneys fees and treble damages – were essential if private citizens like petitioner were to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important public policy which these civil rights laws contain. Petitioner asserted that he brought the lawsuit to fight unfair discrimination against handicapped people and that he was able to obtain counsel only because counsel was of the opinion that attorneys fees would be available if petitioner prevailed on the merits. If attorneys fees are not to be available in a case such as this, petitioner argued, airlines will be free to deny handicapped individuals their right to travel with impunity.

Finally, petitioner called the Court's attention to the national importance of the case flowing from the fact that *Hingson* has been relied upon to pre-empt civil rights statutes, as they affect airlines, in other jurisdictions. *See, e.g., Anderson v. USAIR, Inc.*, 818 F.2d 49, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("A state law obligation . . . is expressly pre-empted. . . . [S]ee . . . *Hingson*, 743 F.2d at 1415-16 (claim based on state law entitling blind persons to full and equal access pre-empted by Aviation Act.)").

In light of the importance of the remedies provided in Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3, petitioner argued that it was inconceivable that Congress intended to pre-empt California's civil rights laws as they affect airlines, adding that the implication of *Hingson* was staggering because:

> If an airline is free to deny passage to a handicapped person without being liable for damages under California's Anti-Discrimination Law, the airline is

equally free to deny passage based on race, sex or age.

On March 6, 1989 the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT PRE-EMPTS CALIFORNIA'S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTE, AS IT AFFECTS AIR COMMON CARRIERS, CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S RECENT PRE-EMPTION CASES AND IMPERMISSIBLY INVADES A FIELD TRADITIONALLY OCCUPIED BY THE STATES.

Before demonstrating that *Hingson* is in clear conflict with this Court's pre-emption cases, petitioner calls the Court's attention to the nationwide impact of that erroneous decision. As already noted the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit followed *Hingson*. *Anderson v. USAir, supra*. Predictably the district courts have fallen into line. *See Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines*, 682 F. Supp. 378, 379 (N.D. Ill. 1988), and cases there cited ("All courts have unanimously held that, with [49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)], Congress intended to pre-empt all state statutes and common law rules which affect rates or services regarding air travel . . . .").

On April 18, 1989, this Court laid out the path to be followed in pre-emption cases. *California v. ARC America Corporation*, No. 87-1862, 57 L.W. 4425. Justice White speaking for a unanimous Court stated that "[i]n the absence of an express statement by Congress that state law is pre-empted," pre-emption occurs only when "Congress intends that federal law occupy a given field,"

when "compliance with both state and federal law is impossible," or when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of congress."

Justice White added that there is a "presumption against finding pre-emption of state law in areas traditionally regulated by the states." *See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.*, 471 U.S. 707, 716 (1985). When Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the States, the Court starts with the assumption "that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by a Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." *See, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.*, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Pre-emption analysis begins with respect for "the separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in our federalist system. *Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne*, 482 U.S. [1] at 19." *Massachusetts v. Morash*, No. 88-32, 57 L.W. 4429, 4432 (Apr. 18, 1989).

Given the long history of state common law and statutory remedies forbidding discrimination by common carriers against disadvantaged groups, it is plain that Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54.1(a) and 54.3 operate in an area traditionally regulated by the States. The early common law attached to common carriers certain obligations including "the duty to serve all customers on reasonable terms without discrimination." *In re Cox*, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 212 (1970). The California Legislature, in 1897, enacted this common law doctrine into the statutory predecessor of the present Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, 52. *Id.* at 213. The 1897 Act provided:

> [A]ll citizens within the jurisdiction of this State shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, of . . . all . . . places of public accommodation. . . .

The Civil Rights Act was expanded in 1968, with the enactment of Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(a), to specifically afford handicapped individuals some of the civil rights Cal. Civ. Code § 51 affords other disadvantaged groups.[5] That provision is merely a statutory extension of the common law. *See James v. Marineship Corp.*, 25 Cal. 2d 721, 730 (1944).

Statutes such as Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 and 54.1(a) are declaratory of California's public policy, affording all persons equal access to common carriers. In *In re Marriage of Carney*, 24 Cal. 3d 728 (1979) the California Supreme Court pointed to Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1 as part of the growing body of legislation enacted to advance the state's public policy "to encourage and enable disabled persons to participate fully in the social and economic life of the state. . . ." *Id.* at 740. This State public policy is, of course, harmonious with federal public policy. *Id.* at 741 n.11 (Congress has enacted legislation inhibiting discrimination against handicapped individuals).

In light of these principles the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that California's anti-discrimination laws are nullified, as they affect airlines. There is no claim that the

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[5] In 1987 Cal. Civ. Code § 51 was expanded to protect handicapped individuals as well as other disadvantaged groups, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West 1989). The 1987 amendment does not apply to this case.

Federal Aviation Act expressly pre-empts State laws providing attorneys fees and treble damages to individuals subjected to handicap discrimination, and as *Nader, supra,* hold the antipre-emption provision of the Aviation Act furnishes strong support against the existence of pre-emption. *See Greater Westchester v. City of Los Angeles,* 26 Cal. 3d 86, 100 (1979), *cert. den.* 449 U.S. 820 (1980) (The savings clause of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1506, would seem to preserve the validity of pre-existing state law involving "the State's traditional interest in compensating its citizens for damages incurred."); *see, also, People v. Western Airlines, Inc.,* 155 Cal. App. 3d 297 (1984) (State regulation of interstate air carriers is pre-empted only where the federal and state regulatory schemes conflict irreconcilably.).

Hingson did not give any weight to *Nader,* or 49 U.S.C. § 1506, relegating them to a footnote, stating:

> Because California Civ. Code § 54.1 would involve regulation of the services of an air carrier, we conclude that Hingson's claims under the state statute are pre-empted notwithstanding the savings clause in § 1506. Cf. *Nader* . . . (§ 1506 allows common law action for misrepresentation).

743 F.2d at 1416 n.11.

Hingson questioned the relevance of the antipre-emption provision stating that "[t]he legislative history of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 does not explain the relation between § 1506 and § 1305(a)." *Ibid.* The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, concluded § 1506 saves remedies provided by state statutes "even when federal law exclusively determines the content of the substantive rules." *Bieneman v. City of Chicago,* 864 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir.

1988), *cert. den.* No. 88-1496 (May 22, 1989). In *Bieneman* the Court stated that *Nader* holds that the savings clause "preserves against pre-emption a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation; that state courts award compensation for takings in inverse condemnation cases; and that state courts "award damages every day in air crash cases, notwithstanding that federal law pre-empts the regulation of safety in air travel." *Id.* at 471. Under these circumstances the Court concluded that damages should also be available on questions of noise and chemical emissions by airlines.

Bieneman overruled *Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee,* 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975), which held that state tort law was pre-empted by the Federal Aviation Act stating:

> Since the federal laws and regulations have pre-empted local control of aircraft flights, *Burbank [v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc.,* 411 U.S. 624 (1973)], the defendants may not, to the extent they comply with such federal laws and regulations, be charged with negligence or creating a nuisance. Similarly, . . . Wisconsin statutes cannot be invoked to make unlawful flights which are in accordance with federal laws and regulations. . . .

521 F.2d at 391.

In overruling *Luedtke Bieneman* stated:

> Since *Luedtke* every court that has examined the question independently has come to the opposite conclusion. *Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles,* 26 Cal. 3d 86, 100 (1979) *cert. den.* 449 U.S. 820 (1980). . . . The Solicitor General, in a brief filed at the Supreme Court's invitation in *Greater Westchester,* informed the Court that *Luedtke* had been

> decided incorrectly but that because *Luedtke* stood alone the conflict did not require resolution.

864 F.2d at 470-71.

Bieneman observed that the plaintiff in the case before it wanted "damages, not regulations," adding that "[p]erhaps this is a distinction without a difference," because "[a]n award of damages is compensatory from Bieneman's perspective, but from [the airport's] it is no different from regulation." *Id.* at 472. Logically, the Court stated, "[t]he identity of common law damages and penalties for disobedience to substantive rules could lead to a conclusion that where a state is forbidden to alter the substantive rule, it is forbidden to award damages" but, the Court of Appeals added *"Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee* rejects this equation." *Id.* at 472. The Seventh Circuit stated that since *Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Conservation & Development Comm'n*, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) held that federal law occupies the field of nuclear safety regulation, it would appear to be a truism "that an award of hefty compensatory and punitive damages" was a forbidden method of regulating safety. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals observed, *Silkwood* held "that federal law does not pre-empt common law remedies concerning nuclear safety." *Silkwood*, the Court of Appeals concluded, highlights the extreme reluctance of the Court to find pre-emption, adding:

> if no pre-emption is the conclusion notwithstanding the absence from nuclear safety legislation of a statute such as § 1106 [The Aviation Act's Antipre-emption provision] it must be the appropriate treatment of air travel as well. *Luedtke* did not mention any of these considerations, and its holding cannot be maintained in the face of them."

Id. at 472. Similarly, in the case at bar the Ninth Circuit did not mention any of these considerations, and its holding that §§ 54.1(a) and 54.3 are pre-empted cannot be maintained in the face of settled law.

Hingson suggested that pre-emption was required because of a Civil Aeronautics Board regulation dealing with handicap discrimination by airlines. 473 F.2d at 1415. That regulation, however, did not purport to be exclusive, nor did it suggest in any way that there was no room for a state law to require an air common carrier guilty of handicap discrimination to pay attorney's fees and treble damages. In *Hillsborough County Fla. v. Auto. Med. Labs, supra,* the Court rejected the argument that pre-emption may be inferred from comprehensive administrative regulations stating:

> To infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals with a problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a federal agency decides to step into a field, its regulation will be exclusive. Such a rule, of course, would be inconsistent with the federal/state balance embodied in our supremacy clause jurisprudence. *See Jones v. Rath Packing Co.*, 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).

Id. at 719.

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted because this case is of national importance, affecting hundreds of thousands of mobility handicapped individuals who regularly face thoughtless or intentional discrimination by airlines. Unless those subjected to unlawful discrimination can avail themselves of the remedies provided by Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3 – attorneys fees and treble damages – they will be denied a meaningful opportunity to vindicate their rights, because compensatory

damages for a civil rights violation are usually inadequate to justify the difficult litigation entailed in such cases. The record in this case reveals that the litigation would never have been undertaken if counsel did not believe he would be entitled to reasonable fees if he succeeded. If such fees are not to be available in the future, counsel will not be available.

Hingson is the leading case holding that the Federal Aviation Act pre-empts state statutes such as Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54.1(a) and 54.3, and it has spawned the rule that 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a) pre-empts "*all* state statutes and common law rules" which *may* "affect rates or services regarding air travel." *Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines, supra,* 682 F. Supp. at 379. The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted, and this case should be used as the vehicle to undo the mischief caused by *Hingson.*

CONCLUSION

For the aforesaid reasons the petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Dated: June 2, 1989

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX A

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM DYKENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.	) No. 87-5843) D.C.# CV-86-2553-WMB)) MEMORANDUM*)) FILED JAN 5 1989

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
William Matthew Byrne, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Argued and submitted December 9, 1988
Pasadena, California

Before: BROWNING, SCHROEDER, and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.

The appellant appeals from the district court's decision that he was not entitled to treble damages and attorney's fees under California law after prevailing in his action for breach of the common law duty of carriage by a common carrier.

The plaintiff's action arose out of defendant's refusal to seat him on a flight. Eastern's refusal was based on his handicap, and he claimed unlawful discrimination on the

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*This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

basis of both state and federal law. The district court held that there was no federal or state statutory remedy available, but awarded $15,000 on a common law theory. The airline did not cross-appeal.

On appeal, Dykens first claims entitlement to treble damages and attorney's fees pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3 (West 1982). The district court correctly found this statute to be preempted, relying upon our decision in *Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines*, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984). In *Hingson* we stated that:

> [Federal] preemption [by the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)] is not limited to those state laws or regulations that *conflict* with federal law. It preempts state laws and regulations "*relating* to rates, routes, or services." Regulation of air carrier seating policies for handicapped passengers involves the regulation of services within the meaning of [the Federal Aviation Act].

Hingson, 743 F.2d at 1415 (original emphasis) (citations omitted). Just as the passenger's claim for unlawful discrimination on the basis of a handicap was held preempted in *Hingson*, so must this similar claim be held preempted here. This case is unlike *Air Transport Ass'n v. Public Utilities Commission*, 833 F.2d 200, 207 (9th Cir. 1987), where we stated that the Federal Aviation Act did not preempt California utility regulations that prohibited the surreptitious monitoring of employees' telephone conversations. In *Air Transport* we noted that there was nothing in the history of the Airline Deregulation Act to indicate a congressional intent to preempt state regulation of utilities insofar as such regulation affected airlines. *Id.* Unlike *Air Transport*, the case at bar is indistinguishable from *Hingson*, and the claim for treble

damages and attorney's fees is preempted by the Federal Aviation Act. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1)(1982).

We then turn to plaintiff's claim of entitlement to attorney's fees on the basis of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5 (West 1980). The airline argues that in view of the preemption of state law in this field, the district court's award of relief must have been based upon federal as opposed to state common law. The district court's reasoning is not entirely clear on this point. Even assuming appellant is correct that the ruling was based upon state common law, and disregarding for the moment the preemption problems inherent in such a ruling, we must nevertheless conclude the denial of fees under section 1021.5 was not an abuse of discretion. The incident here was an isolated failure by a single employee to follow Eastern's policies. No pattern or practice of discrimination appears. Although the vindication of existing rights may be a basis for an award of fees under section 1021.5, *see Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc.*, 34 Cal.3d 311, 318, 193 Cal. Rptr. 900, 904 (1983), we perceive no abuse of discretion in the determination that this is not an appropriate case for the award of fees.

Finally, Eastern seeks attorney's fees and costs, alleging this appeal is frivolous. Fed. R. App. P. 38. While appellant's claims are ultimately unpersuasive, we do not believe them frivolous.

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM DYKENS, Plaintiff, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., et al., Defendants.	CV 86-2553-WMB FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FILED MAR 25 1987

This case was tried by the Court without a jury. The Court now makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Defendant, Eastern Airlines, Inc. (Eastern), is a certified scheduled airline and a common carrier.

2. Plaintiff, William Dykens, is a non-ambulatory physically disabled person as a result of cerebal palsy.

3. As a certified air carrier, Eastern was required to file, and did file, a tariff showing its rules, regulations, practices, and services in connection with air transportation. The tariff which was in effect as of July 6, 1985 provided:

> [Eastern] accepts for transportation a non-ambulatory passenger who is capable of caring for his or her own needs while on board an [Eastern] aircraft provided:

> (a) [Eastern] is advised of the nature of the non-ambulatory passenger's condition and
>
> (b) Reservations are made 24 hours or more in advance of the scheduled departure time of the flight on which the non-ambulatory passenger seeks to travel. . . .

4. As a certified air carrier, Eastern is subject to Subpart A of the Regulation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap. 14 C.F.R. Ch. II. The purpose of Subpart A "is to ensure that handicapped persons receive adequate air transportation service, without unjust discrimination based on handicap," and it provides that certified carriers "shall not discriminate against any qualified handicapped person because of that person's handicap." 14 C.F.R. §§ 382.1 and 382.4.

5. Plaintiff is a "qualified handicapped person" and was eligible to board a carrier aircraft as a non-ambulatory person able to take care of his own needs.

6. Plaintiff had a reservation for Eastern Airlines Flight 80 scheduled to depart at Los Angeles International Airport on July 6, 1985 at 10:55 p.m.

7. Plaintiff made his reservation through Eastern's reservation agent more than 24 hours prior to flight time. In making the reservation, he advised the agent that he was disabled, used a wheelchair and needed certain assistance getting on and off the plane. Plaintiff was advised that there would be no problem. He then purchased a roundtrip Eastern ticket to and from Syracuse, New York, through a travel agency.

8. Plaintiff arrived at the check-in counter late for Flight 80. Plaintiff was further delayed by the turmoil at the ticket counter, for which plaintiff was not responsible.

9. Plaintiff checked his baggage at the ticket counter, and it was placed on Flight 80.

10. The agent at the ticket counter told plaintiff to proceed to the departure gate and told him that he had only five minutes to get to the plane. Plaintiff testified that the agent told him she would call the gate and tell them he was coming.

11. The aircraft was ready for departure when plaintiff arrived at the airplane gate. However, the aircraft was still available for boarding at that time. The airplane was scheduled for departure at 10:55 p.m. The actual "push back" time from the gate for this flight on the evening of July 6, 1985 was 11:20 p.m.

12. The agent at the gate advised plaintiff that he could not fly without an attendant because he was physically disabled and non-ambulatory. The gate agent then changed his mind and told plaintiff he could board.

13. Then, the flight stewardess and flight engineer, either separately or jointly, decided that plaintiff would not be allowed to board the aircraft.

14. Plaintiff was not permitted to board Flight 80 by agents of defendant.

15. Eastern responded in a reasonable manner after it wrongfully denied plaintiff passage on Flight 80.

16. Eastern made a reservation for plaintiff on the next available flight.

17. Plaintiff flew unattended on the next available flight, departing Los Angeles International Airport at approximately 7:00 a.m. the next morning, July 7, 1985 and plaintiff flew with no problems experienced en route.

18. Plaintiff did not sustain any physical injury as a result of the subject incident.

19. Plaintiff was damaged as a result of the denied boarding as follows: experienced the inconvenience of making another trip to the airport by a handicapped person; missed one day of vacation; was without his belongings for one day as these were transported as baggage on Flight 80; spent one further day in Los Angeles; and suffered justifiable emotionally severe agitation of a temporary nature.

20. Plaintiff was not lastingly or permanently damaged by the incident; his overall self esteem was not damaged and the agitation did not have a lasting effect.

21. Reasonable compensation for the damages suffered by plaintiff is the sum of $15,000 plus costs.

22. Eastern did not act with malice, fraud or oppression nor did Eastern act with conscious disregard or subject plaintiff to any hardship in conscious or willful disregard herein.

23. Eastern's conduct was not extreme or outrageous.

24. As to the availability of an award of attorney fees under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5 (a codification of the private attorney general doctrine), that section, if applicable, may be an appropriate basis for an award of attorney fees in this case.

25. Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees under Section 1021.5 because this case did not result in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest nor did it vindicate an important public interest.

26. This case did not involve a challenge to airline policies or rules of procedure. Rather, the case involved an incident where individual employees made mistakes that deprived plaintiff of rights to which he was entitled. The judgment was a victory for plaintiff individually.

27. The case has not brought about any changes in Eastern's policies towards handicapped persons.

28. Any Conclusion of Law deemed to be a Finding of Fact is hereby incorporated into these Findings of Fact.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Any Finding of Fact deemed to be a Conclusion of Law is hereby incorporated into these Conclusions of Law.

2. Plaintiff is a resident of the State of California. Defendant Eastern Airlines is a foreign corporation. The matter in controversy exceeds $10,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs. The Court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

3. Eastern is not a recipient of federal financial assistance and is therefore not subject to the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.

4. Plaintiff does not have a private cause of action under the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a).

5. Eastern is not liable for a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

6. Eastern is not liable for a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

7. Plaintiff's claims under California Civil Code §§ 54.1 and 54.3 are preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a).

8. The damage and attorney fee provisions of California Civil Code § 54.3 do not apply to an actionable violation of a common law duty of denied boarding.

9. Eastern breached its common law duty of carriage as a result of a violation of its tariff, its Standard Operating Practices, and the governing regulation prohibiting discrimination against qualified handicapped people.

10. Eastern is liable to plaintiff for a breach of its common law duty under *Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.*, 426 U.S. 290, 96 S. Ct. 1978 (1976).

11. Plaintiff is not entitled to the recovery of punitive damages.

12. Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5.

13. Judgment shall enter accordingly, awarding plaintiff damages in the sum of $15,000, plus costs.

DATED: March 25, 1987

/s/ Wm. Matthew Byrne
Wm. Matthew Byrne, Jr.
United States District Judge

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM DYKENS,	) No. 87-5843
Plaintiff-Appellant,	) D.C.# CV-86-2553-WMB
v.	) (Central California)
EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., et al.,	) ORDER
Defendants-Appellees.	) FILED MAR 6 1989

Before: BROWNING, SCHROEDER, and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.

The panel as constituted above has voted to deny the petition for rehearing and to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc and no judge of the court has requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for rehearing en banc is rejected.

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JUL 12 1989
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

No. 88-1991

In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1988

WILLIAM DYKENS,

Petitioner,

v.

EASTERN AIRLINES, INC.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Should this Court use this unpublished decision to overrule a federal preemption decision which has been followed and never criticized for five years and which does not conflict with decisions of this Court or other Circuits, so that this Petitioner may supplement the money damages he has been awarded with attorneys' fees and treble damages which are available to him only under state statutes which Congress has expressly preempted?

LIST OF PARTIES and RULE 28.1 LISTING

All parties and their positions are identified in the caption of this Brief in Opposition. The parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates of Respondent Eastern Airlines, Inc., are:

Texas Air Corporation
Continental-Eastern Sales, Inc.
Continental Airlines, Inc.
System One Holding, Inc.
Jet Capital Corporation

TOPICAL INDEX

Page

Jurisdiction 1

Statutes Involved 2

Statement Of The Case 2

Reasons For Denying The Writ 6

I.

Hingson Is Correct And Does Not Conflict With Rulings Of This Court Or Of Other Circuits 6

II.

Handicapped Individuals Are Not Without Protection. Federal Laws And Regulations Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Handicap, And Common Law Tort Remedies Are Available 10

III.

This Case Is Of Limited Importance Inasmuch As It Is Not For Publication And It Pertains Only To Handicap Discrimination Cases Which Are Brought Under Rare State Discrimination Statutes Which Authorize Extraordinary Civil Damages For Handicap Discrimination 12

Conclusion 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases Page

Air Transport Association v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 833 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1987) 9
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612 (1975) 7
Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 9
Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988) 9, 10
California v. ARC America Corp. No. 87-1862, 57 L.W. 4425 7
Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 711 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1983) *cert. denied* 478 U.S. 1021, 106 S.Ct. 3335 (1986) 1
Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Systems, Inc., 790 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1986) 2
Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984) 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11
Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines, 682 F.Supp. 378 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 9
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 106 S.Ct. 1890 (1986) 7
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 96 S.Ct. 1978 (1976) 8, 10
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959) 7
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America v. Butler, 803 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986) 2

Statutes

11 U.S.C.S.
§ 362(a)(1) 1

29 U.S.C.S.
§ 794 ..... 2, 3
§ 794(a)(b) 3

49 U.S.C.S. Appx
§ 1305(a) 4
§ 1305(a)(1) 6, 7, 8, 9
§ 1374(c) 2, 3
§ 1506 10

14 C.F.R.
§ 382.2 11
§ 382.4 11
§ 382.5 11
§ 382.25 11

Ala. Code
§ 21-7-3 13
§ 21-7-5 13

Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 20-14-302 13

Cal. Civil Code
§ 54.1 3
§ 54.3 3

California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 1021.5 4

Fla. Stat.
§ 413.08 13

Hawaii Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 347-13 13
§ 347-13.5 13

Idaho Code
§ 56-703 13
§ 56-706 13

Ill. Rev. Stat.
§ 23-3363 13
§ 23-3364 13

La. Rev. Code
§ 46:1952(B) 13

Miss. Code Ann.
§ 43-6-5 13
§ 43-6-11 13

N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-7-3 13
§ 28-7-5 13

N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 168.3 13
§ 168-4.5 13

Okla. Stat. Title 7
§ 19.1 13
§ 19.2 13

Pa. Stat. Ann. Title 43
§ 953 13
§ 954 13
§ 961 13

S.C. Code
§ 43-33-20 13
§ 43-33-40 13

Vt. Stat. Ann. Title 9
§ 4501 13
§ 4502(c) 13
§ 4506 13

Other Authorities

1978 U.S. Cong. & Admin News
(House Report No. 95-1211) 9

No. 88-1991

In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1988

WILLIAM DYKENS,

Petitioner,

v.

EASTERN AIRLINES, INC.,

Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

JURISDICTION

Respondent submits that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Petition inasmuch as Respondent EASTERN AIRLINES, INC. filed a petition for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code on March 9, 1989. The automatic and mandatory stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code apply to this Petition inasmuch as it pertains to "continuation . . . [of an] action . . . against the debtor that was . . . commenced before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case." 11 U.S.C.S. 362(a)(1) (1985).

In *Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.*, 711 F.2d 60, 62 (6th Cir. 1983) *cert. denied* 478 U.S. 1021, 106 S.Ct. 3335 (1986) the Sixth Circuit held that the

automatic bankruptcy stay attaches to appeals taken from tort actions against the debtor. *See also*, *Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Systems, Inc.*, 790 F.2d 206, 207 (2d Cir. 1986) ("An appeal is indisputably a continuation of a judicial action . . . ."); *Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America v. Butler*, 803 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1986).

STATUTES INVOLVED

To supplement the statutes set forth in the Petition, the substantive provisions of the Federal Aviation Act and the Rehabilitation Act prohibiting handicap discrimination in the airline industry are set forth below.

Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.S. Appx § 1374(c) (Supp. May 1989):

> No air carrier may discriminate against any otherwise qualified handicapped individual, by reason of such handicap, in the provision of air transportation.

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 794 (Supp. May 1989):

> No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On March 25, 1986 Petitioner William Dykens (hereinafter "Petitioner" or "Dykens") filed a complaint alleging that he, as a handicapped person, was wrongfully

denied air transportation as a result of a deviation by Respondent Eastern Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter "Eastern") from its tariff and policy of accepting handicapped passengers for transportation, consistent with the safety of other passengers. The complaint set forth claims for (1) violation of California Civil Code sections 54.1 and 54.3, state statutes concerning the rights of handicapped persons to public conveyances, public accommodations, and housing and (2) violation of federal statutes respecting discrimination against the handicapped in air travel, namely, provisions of the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. Appx § 1374(c)) and provisions of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. Appx § 794).[1]

The matter proceeded to trial, on the same facts, under both the federal and state handicap discrimination statutes.[2] The district court made findings of fact that Petitioner Dykens was denied boarding in a last-minute decision made when Eastern's already-delayed plane was ready for departure, that Eastern acted reasonably after the denied boarding by flying Petitioner on the next available flight, that Petitioner sustained no physical injury, that Eastern did not act with malice, fraud,

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[1]Petitioner also set forth a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. After trial the district court ruled on the merits that Eastern was not liable for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. (App. 7, 9.) Petitioner does not challenge judgment in favor of Eastern on the tort claim.

[2]The Rehabilitation Act authorizes recovery of attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing or charging a violation of the Act. 29 U.S.C.S. § 794a(b) (1982). The Federal Aviation Act does not authorize recovery of attorneys' fees. The state statutues authorize recovery of treble damages and attorneys' fees. Cal. Civil Code §§ 54.1, 54.3.

oppression or conscious or willful disregard, and that its conduct was not outrageous or extreme. (App. 6-7.)[3]

With respect to the federal statutes, the district court held that inasmuch as Eastern is not a recipient of federal financial assistance, the Rehabilitation Act does not apply to it, and that Petitioner had no private cause of action under the Federal Aviation Act. (App. 8.) Petitioner did not appeal these rulings.

The district court held that Petitioner's claim under the California state statutes was preempted pursuant to the preemption provision in the Federal Aviation Act at 49 U.S.C. Appx § 1305(a), which prohibits the states from "enact[ing] or enforc[ing] any law, regulation, standard or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority . . . to provide air transportation." (App. 9.)

Petitioner recovered his common law remedy of damages and costs. He was awarded $15,000 for his inconvenience. He had retained his attorney pursuant to a 40% contingency fee contract. Although he was clearly not entitled to attorneys' fees or treble damages under the pertinent federal statutes, one of which authorized attorneys' fees when applicable, Petitioner sought attorneys' fees and treble damages under the state statutes and under the private attorney general doctrine, as codified in California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5.

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[3]All references to Appendix A of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari will be designated "App." followed by the page number(s).

The district court held that Petitioner was not entitled to attorneys' fees or treble damages under the state statutes, they having been preempted by the preemption clause in the federal statute, and that Petitioner was not entitled to attorneys' fees under the private attorney general doctrine upon a factual determination that the case did not result in vindication of an important public interest, inasmuch as it involved only a judgment mistake by individual employees, did not challenge airline policies or procedures, did not bring about any change in Eastern's policies toward handicapped persons and did not have any precedential value. (App. 8.)

Petitioner appealed the damages issue to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In a not-for-publication memorandum, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that attorneys' fees and treble damages were not available under the state statutes inasmuch as they were preempted, holding that the case was controlled by its 1984 decision in *Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines*, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court's determination that the case was inappropriate for application of the private attorney general doctrine. (App. 2-3.)

Petitioner now asks this Court to grant extraordinary relief, in the form of a writ of certiorari requiring that *Hingson* be overruled, to enable him to recover attorneys' fees and treble damages in addition to his common law recovery, even though federal antidiscrimination law contains a preemption provision which expressly precludes the state statutes on which he relies and even though Petitioner was not entitled to such remedies under the pertinent federal antidiscrimination statutes.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I.

HINGSON IS CORRECT AND DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH RULINGS OF THIS COURT OR OF OTHER CIRCUITS.

Petitioner's claim that the *Hingson* case conflicts with preemption principles announced by this Court rests upon his erroneous assertion that "[t]here is no claim that the Federal Aviation Act expressly pre-empts State laws providing attorneys fees and treble damages to individuals subjected to handicap discrimination . . . ." (Pet. at pp. 11-12.)[4] There *is* just such an express preemption provision in the Federal Aviation Act at 49 U.S.C.S. Appx § 1305(a)(1) (Supp. May 1989), which provides in relevant part:

> [N]o State . . . shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority . . . to provide air transportation.

This Court's pronouncements regarding preemption explain that preemption occurs in two circumstances—when, in enacting a federal statute, Congress expresses an intent to preempt state law by promulgating a preemption provision, such as the one contained in the Federal Aviation Act, or when Congress's intent to preempt may otherwise be inferred, for instance, under such circumstances as actual irreconcilable conflict

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[4]All references to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari will be designated "Pet." followed by the page number(s).

between the federal and state law. *California v. ARC America Corp.*, No. 87-1862, 57 L.W. 4425; *Louisiana Public Service Commission v. F.C.C.*, 476 U.S. 355, 106 S.Ct. 1890, 1898 (1986). This Court has further declared that in providing statutory attorney's fees provisions to encourage private enforcement in some circumstances, and in omitting similar provisions in other circumstances, Congress has made an implicit legislative determination as to which policies warrant such encouragement. *Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society*, 421 U.S. 240, 264, 95 S.Ct. 1612 (1975). Remedies form an ingredient of any scheme of regulation, such that state law granting remedies not available under federal law is preempted. *San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon*, 359 U.S. 236, 247, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959).

Because Congress expressly stated its intent to preempt state law relating to air carrier services, it is not necessary to look to the several cases cited by Petitioner respecting the standards for inferring an intent on the part of Congress to preempt.[5] There is no need to rely on inference or search for conflict when Congress states its intention to preempt.

Like Petitioner, the plaintiff in the *Hingson* case refused to acknowledge the effect of the preemption provision in the Federal Aviation Act. The Ninth Circuit rejected his attempt to apply inferential preemption standards when Congress had declared its intent to preempt and the scope of that preemption in the legislation. The court declared:

> Hingson argues that 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) does not preempt his claims because Civil Code Section 54.1 does not conflict with federal law.

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[5]Pet. at pp. 7, 9-10, 12, 15.

> This argument misses the point. Section 1305(a)(1) preemption is not limited to those state laws or regulations that *conflict* with federal law. It preempts state laws and regulations "*relating* to rates routes, or services." 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (emphasis added [by *Hingson* Court]).
> *Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines*, 743 F.2d 1408, 1415 (1984) (emphasis in original).

Contrary to Petitioner's claim, *Hingson* does not conflict with decisions of this Court concerning standards for inferring Congressional intent to preempt state legislation.

Nor does *Hingson* conflict with this Court's decision in *Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.*, 426 U.S. 290, 96 S.Ct. 1978 (1976). In *Nader* the Court, without addressing the preemption clause in the Federal Aviation Act at all, found only implicitly that a common law cause for misrepresentation may survive when it ruled that litigation of the common law claim did not have to be stayed pending administrative consideration by the Civil Aeronautics Board. *ID.* at 1983, 1988. The *Nader* ruling did not concern claims under state discrimination statutes. In accord with *Nader's* implicit holding that not all common law claims are preempted, the *Hingson* court held that Hingson's common law tort claim for infliction of emotional distress was not preempted. *Hingson*, *supra*, 743 F.2d at 1416.

The *Hingson* court gave careful attention to the preemption issue. The only analysis of the relationship between the preemption provision at section 1305(a)(1) and the savings clause at section 1506 of the Federal Aviation Act was made by the *Hingson* court. The court considered the legislative history of the two provisions

and found that the savings clause was simply incorporated intact from 1938 legislation, while the preemption section was specifically enacted as part of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 for the purpose of preventing state regulation. Legislative history also revealed that a narrow version of the preemption provision, under which only state enactment of laws determining routes, schedules or fares or other economic regulations would have been preempted, was rejected in favor of a broad preemption provision which preempted state enactment *and enforcement* of laws *relating* to rates, routes and *services* of air carriers. See *Hingson*, *supra*, 743 F.2d at 1416, fn. 11, and portions of House Report No. 95-1211, reprinted at 1978 U.S. Cong. & Admin. News at 3804-805.

In the five years since *Hingson* was decided, it has never been overruled or even criticized. It was accepted as correct in *Anderson v. USAir, Inc.*, 818 F.2d 49, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1987); *Air Transport Association v. Public Utilities Commission of California*, 833 F.2d 200, 207 (9th Cir. 1987); and *Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines*, 682 F.Supp. 378, 379 (N.D. Ill. 1988). It was followed in *Anderson v. USAir, Inc.*, *supra*, and *Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines*, *supra*. There is no conflict among the Circuits.

In *Bieneman v. City of Chicago*, 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988), cited by Petitioner, the court considered a claim that the value of the plaintiff's land had been reduced by noise and chemicals in aircraft exhaust from nearby O'Hare Airport. Bieneman's claim, unlike Petitioner Dyken's claim, did not relate to the services rendered by an air carrier, and presumably the section 1305(a)(1) preemption provision did not apply. As a consequence, the *Bieneman* court relied on the savings

clause at section 1506 of the Federal Aviation Act. Moreover, the case merely held that not all common law remedies are preempted, as the *Hingson* case acknowledged. *Bieneman v. City of Chicago*, 864 F.2d at 472-73.

Hingson was correctly decided, does not conflict with *Nader* or the inferred preemption cases decided by this Court, does not conflict with *Bieneman* or any other Circuit decision, and has never been so much as criticized by any other Circuit.

II.

HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS ARE NOT WITHOUT PROTECTION. FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP, AND COMMON LAW TORT REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE.

Petitioner's claim that "airlines will be free to deny handicapped individuals their right to travel with impunity"[6] is unfounded. Were it not for federal laws and regulations prohibiting handicap discrimination, this preemption question would never have arisen. Both the Federal Aviation Act and the Rehabilitation Act, substantive provisions of which are set forth in the "Statutes Involved" section of this brief, prohibit discrimination on the basis of handicap. In addition, the Civil Aeronautics Board has adopted regulations which prohibit discrimination against the handicapped

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[6] Pet. at p. 8.

by air carriers. 14 C.F.R. §§ 382.2, 382.4, 382.5 (1988).[7] Violation of these laws and regulations can result in termination of federal financial assistance, assessment of civil penalties or issuance of a cease and desist order. 14 C.F.R. § 382.25 (1988).

Moreover, Petitioner and other handicapped individuals have common law remedies. In this case, petitioner prevailed on his common law claim[8] and was awarded $15,000 for the inconvenience of being required to take the next available flight the following morning. As Petitioner stresses, the courts have upheld the right of handicapped individuals to press certain common law claims against air carriers. (See cases cited at Pet. pp. 13-14.) The *Hingson* court also acknowledged preservation of the plaintiff's tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. *Hingson*, *supra*, at 1416.

The fact that extraordinary remedies created by state legislation are preempted has not deprived Petitioner of his rights and remedy. Petitioner's claim is not that he has no remedy, but that he believes it should be greater. A ruling by this Court would not create rights in those who would otherwise be unprotected.

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[7]These regulations prohibit exclusion from or denial of the benefit of any air transportation or related service to a qualified handicapped person and provision of separate or different air transportation or related services when not reasonably necessary.

[8]Whether Petitioner's common law remedy arose under state or federal common law is a peripheral question which is not raised by this Petition.

III.

THIS CASE IS OF LIMITED IMPORTANCE INASMUCH AS IT IS NOT FOR PUBLICATION AND IT PERTAINS ONLY TO HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION CASES WHICH ARE BROUGHT UNDER RARE STATE DISCRIMINATION STATUTES WHICH AUTHORIZE EXTRAORDINARY CIVIL DAMAGES FOR HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION.

The ruling of this case was not published and has no precedential value. A ruling by this Court could affect only cases arising under the limited number of state statutes prohibiting handicap discrimination on airplanes and authorizing extraordinary civil remedies, not otherwise available as a common law remedy or under the private attorney general doctrine, for such discrimination.

Although many states have enacted statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap in such areas as employment and housing, significantly fewer states have attempted to prohibit physical handicap discrimination on airplanes by way of state legislation. Still fewer have enacted statutes which provide civil remedies. Most states which have legislated on the subject provide that violation of the statute constitutes a misdemeanor and may result in imposition of a small

fine.[9]

A preliminary search of state statutes revealed only two other states which expressly authorize civil actions for damages to enforce state statutes prohibiting physical handicap discrimination on air carriers.[10]

This Petition, by which Petitioner seeks to recover extraordinary damages in addition to the compensatory damages which he was awarded, as well as lacking substantive merit, as discussed above, does not present an issue of sufficiently broad impact to warrant review by this Court.

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[9] *See e.g.*, Ala. Code §§ 21-7-3, 21-7-5 (1984); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-14-302 (1987); Fla. Stat. § 413.08 (1988); Idaho Code §§ 56-703, 56-706 (1988); Ill. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-3363, 23-3364 (1987); La. Rev. Stat. § 46:1952(B) (1986); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-6-5, 43-6-11 (1988); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-7-3, 28-7-5 (1988); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 168.3, 168-4.5 (1988); Okla. Stat. tit. 7, §§ 19.1, 19.2 (1987); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 953, 954, 961 (1989); S.C. Code §§ 43-33-20, 43-33-40 (1988).

[10] Hawaii Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 347-13, 347-13.5 (1988) (limits damages to $1,000 and authorizes recovery of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, §§ 4501, 4502(c) and 4506 (1988) (authorizes a civil action for injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, costs and reasonable attorneys' fees).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondent respectfully submits that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

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PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

State of California

ss.

County of Los Angeles

I, the undersigned, say: I am and was at all times herein mentioned, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County of Los Angeles, over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action or proceeding; that my business address is 11333 Iowa Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90025; that on July 12, 1989, I served the within *Respondent's Brief in Opposition* in said action or proceeding by depositing true copies thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

Clerk, United States
Supreme Court
One First Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20543
(By Express Mail: Original and forty copies)

Stanley Fleishman
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2049 Century Park East
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Frank D. Lanterman Regional Center
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Culver City, California 90230

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on July 12, 1989, at Los Angeles, California.

Betty J. Malloy
(Original signed)